I thought this week’s chapters did a good job of explaining the physiological processes of light and visual perception with an understanding of how this relates to higher-order processing and comprehension of what we are actually seeing. This differentiation is somewhat represented in the Where system and the What system, which respectively account for some of the more basic aspects of perception and more detailed complex aspects. The Where system, which is biologically older and present in other mammals, is responsible for the perception of motion, space, position, depth, three-dimensionality, figure/ground segregation, and overall organization. It is colorblind, as color is not necessary to make these distinctions. The What system is a biologically newer system, which is present in primates. It allows us the ability to recognize objects, including faces, in color and complex detail. It is “color-selective,” Livingstone’s term, meaning that color differences are coded by the two subsystems in the What system (the Form system and the Color system). These color differences are used to detect borders, while the colors themselves are not important.

The differentiation between strictly physiology and processing of these stimulations also allowed for Solso to comment on an interesting mini-discussion about how individuals see the world. On the one hand, he says, “Each of us ‘sees’ the world in profoundly different ways because of the vast diversity in the way we humans develop individual mental structures of the world, which are expressed in our conscious AWAREness” (p. 77). (I wasn’t sure exactly what Solso was referring to when he talked about AWAREness, maybe we could comment on that in class). While this is true, that our individual interpretation of stimuli is impacted by personal, familial, or cultural models that shape a particular reaction or interpretation, this is only one half of the picture. Barring physical deficits in visual perception, the process of “seeing” is almost identical from person to person, it is the attachments that we give to our sights that makes a good deal of difference. Because higher-order processing applies what we know to the sensory information, this process can significantly alter the interpretive meaning assigned to a given stimulus. This is obvious when a group of people all walk away from the same piece of art with different reactions.

On that note, the way in which the visual system echos and/or can be applied to the perception of various forms of art was a topic that came up in both readings but was treated very differently. I would have loved the two authors together in the room to discuss the relationship between the visual system and viewing art. Livingstone discusses this topic in the context of central and peripheral vision; she presents at great length the example of how the Mona Lisa appears to smile when viewed from peripheral vision. Additionally, she talks about how Impressionist paintings perhaps relate to the blurry peripheral vision, as opposed to the clear acuity of central vision in the retina. The example of Monet’s Rue Montorgueil in Paris, Festival of June 30, 1878 shows clearly (no pun intended) that the blurred details is effective when seen through a peripheral as opposed to the central line of sight. We complete the flags mentally so that they appear to have the red, white, and blue stripes of the French flag, but when assessed up close using central vision, we can see that they are not actually true flags.

Solso argues, however, that when we look at pieces of art, our eyes automatically dart to form “snapshots” of foveal vision, to create a clear picture of the entire painting. I suppose these two views are not inherently incompatible, but it would be interesting to hear them discuss it. Livingstone certainly argues that the Impressionist style is more natural in replicating the visual system than the realist style, and more accurate to the way we see and experience the world. Solso adds that realist art may be appealing because it can engage memory systems. This hypothesis seems convincing because memory does not operate as a distinct copy of how we originally experience something, but as a reconstruction of a scene, which would probably appear as though seen through clear vision, rather than peripheral and blurry.