Reading The Case of The Colorblind Painter, I was struck by the notion of the fragility of sight. This was not simply because Mr. I happened to lose his color vision, but because, after reading about the complexities of vision in Margaret Livingstone’s book, it seemed inherent to the mechanism. The eye, comprised of so many connecting devices each integral to the ability to see, seems like it could fall apart at any moment. Though Mr. I suffered injury to his brain and not his eyes, the result of the loss of a significant element of his sight has the same implications. Indeed, what struck me about Mr. I’s case was the spectrum of damage done to his reality by the loss of his color vision; a point truly driven home by Sacks: “The ‘wrongness’ of everything was disturbing, even disgusting, and applied to every circumstance of daily life. He found foods disgusting due to their greyish, dead appearance and had to close his eyes to eat.” This example illustrates the scope of the impairment, and convinces the skeptical reader that this case is not one limited to sight. Indeed, one could argue that the damage done to his perception of his environment is the shallowest of the layers of his issue. What is being described throughout the first half of the article is the significant emotional trauma that Mr. I endures during the early days of his colorblindness. The idea of “wrongness”, usually so shunned by psychologists who dislike viewing their subjects and their realities as falling into categories of “right” and “wrong”, is the sole way to describe Mr. I’s perspective on his condition. Mr. I must also suffer with the knowledge of this wrongness; denied the blissful ignorance of those born colorblind who only know the world one way. Though he can no longer visualize color, it is the comparison between then and now that gives him added discomfort.
Meanwhile, the first chapters of the Livingstone book describe in physiological terms how sight is achieved, citing photoreceptors, incandescent and luminescent light and photons as agents of how neurotypical people can perceive the world. The mechanism itself is rather astounding; like many basic functions there is much more to it than meets the eye (please excuse that horrid pun). After reading those chapters and the Sacks article, I found myself wondering how the two extremes; the emotion involved with seeing and the mechanism that begets it, are so nicely reconciled in neurotypical individuals to create the functional, colorful atmosphere in which we live our daily lives? In other words, with the understanding that through millennia of evolution we are no longer surprised that the sunset is red and purple, how did emotion become integrated into our physiological devices of perception? Returning to Mr. I, a deficit in his sight had far-reaching implications in his life, all emotional and mental in nature. Unlike Virgil from last week, Mr. I had no difficulty negotiating his physical place in his environment, rather, he had trouble relating his environment to himself. It seemed that color dictated his relationship to almost all elements around him; food, art, music, sex, etcetera. How did this connection develop? Livingstone touches upon a related subject; saying that personal background and experience influences they way in which one perceives the world. Influences, but not dictates. However, in another chapter, she refers to Picasso’s The Tragedy, saying, “The colors carry the emotional content of the painting; the melancholy blue color is highly symbolic.” It is interesting to think about where our conceptions of emotion concerned with color originated, and how essential they truly are to the act of simply living. As demonstrated by Mr. I’s condition, emotional stability is nearly reliant on perceptual stability.
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I would like to address the topic you bring up about the relationship between color and emotional life. In your last sentence, you seem to suggest that there is an interdependence between emotional and perceptual stability. I think this connection is developed both socially and culturally.
ReplyDeleteIn the Sacks’ article, post-accident Jonathan misappropriates colors and its corresponding associations. Flesh colored now appeared “rat-colored” to him. What was clean in color now appears "dirtied." I can’t help but think that this comes from our experience within our social and cultural surroundings that generate some common conceptions and connotations associated with colors. Red is passion. Blue is sadness as exemplified in Livingstone’s writing on Picasso. In this case, it is perhaps that the color grey has been so often associated with dirt and filth, dust, oil stains, and indeed rats that caused this mental and emotional repulsion against foods that were once in full colored and now entirely suffused in a gray film? Naturally a rat-colored wife would be unpleasing to the senses. This discordance seems to suggest an even greater contention that desire itself (wants and tastes) are socially and perceptually conceived. Jonathan’s nausea in the onset seems to lie in the fact that he was still operating within a visual paradigm he is no longer physically nor mentally capable of apprehending due to a disconnect between visual input and mental data reinforced by society and culture.
I also was was very interested and perplexed by the complexities of the eye that Livingstone talked about. Not only did it make me think about how the eye is so fragile but how our bodies can overcome and withstand so much but at the same time get hurt or fail us. I can very much relate to the topic and concept of colors creating different emotions and feelings. The other day I wore a yellow shirt which I rarely do. People remarked about it and were almost shocked when they saw me. They felt that I was "bright" and I was even told I seemed "happier". Your statement referring to color and emotions by Livingstone also reminded me of Arnheim's, "A warm person is one who makes us open up. We are attracted, willing to expose freely whatever we have to give. Our reactions to physical chill and warmth are obviously similar. In the same way, warm colors seem to invite us whereas cold ones keep us at a distance. " I agree with this and feel and see this in my life everyday.
ReplyDeleteI was particularly interested by the fact that color exists in so many different entities. The differences in each entity of color is fascinating as is the way in which these entities link together to transform color from something physical into something psychological. As the case of Mr. I shows, each point in the this process creates a unique reality. Any variation within the process of color perception will yield a different "neurological truth"
ReplyDeleteArnheim makes a basic seperation of color into two existences. One in physical space and one perceived. "Generative primaries refer to the processes by which colors come about; fundamental primaries are the elements of what we see once colors appear in the visual field." In this passage Arnheim describes color's transition from a physical world into a perceptual one. After this, color undergoes a multitude of different augmentations before it attains it's final, full meaning in our brains. As Oliver Sacks wrote:
"V4 may be an ultimate generator of color, but it signals to, it converses with, a hundred other systems in the mind-brain; and perhaps it can also be modulated by these. It is at higher levels that integration occurs, that color fuses with memories, expectations, associations, and desires to make a world with resonance and meaning for each of us."
So, colors becomes associated with emotions at a higher point in the brain, but that point is a link in a transformational chain in which each stage is decided by those that preceded it.
It would seem to me that the entire point of a gestalt understanding of certain objective principles regarding color and shape would be to extract--and to save--visual perception, for the most part, from the idea of cultural or societal associations. To be sure, they exist. But could it be that there are color patterns inherent in, say, A RAT, that objectively jar our visual perception, having nothing to do with acculturation or inherited knowledge about the disease carrying potential of rats? And that, in essence, we have evolved such that our visual mechanism naturally perceives certain jarring or filthy color contrasts in objects which are, it turns out, filthy?
ReplyDeleteI would say the nauseating effect in the case of Mr. I had more to do with luminance contrasts in unfamiliar combinations than it did with any societal pattern. We haven't really discussed the idea of "constancy" yet, but to see an object which we are accustomed to viewing as a constant whole, and have the previously constant color pattern broken up into two or three new jarring and totally irreconcilable shades of grey, would undermine our sense of the object as a stable whole. The effect of having to perceive such instability would HAVE to be a nausea of some kind.
In the Livingston, we read about the Monet "Impression Sunrise," and how his decision to make the sun equiluminant with its surroundings rendered the sun unstable, vibratory, "quavering" and rich. Her explanation: that the qualities of stability, motion, and depth, are all registered by the part of the brain sensitive to luminance. Because of its equiluminance with the surrounding sky, the sun literally cannot be seen by the part of the brain that would place it soundly in space, structure, or depth. And yet, our more highly evolved color mechanism picks up the presence of some orange red object. Part of our brain is seeing something the other part of our brain believes not to exist. The EFFECT is destabilizing, but spun, by Monet, in such a way as to be pleasing to the eye.
Whereas the poor Mr. I is dealing with conflict between the luminance sensor, and ANOTHER part of his brain: that which is responsible for perceiving and registering constancy of shape.